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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6—MEANS FOR BETTER PATENT PROTECTION

BRYAN K. WHEELOCK* AND EVAN R. SOTIRIOU**

INTRODUCTION
Since the 1952 Patent Act, inventors have been able to claim an element of
an invention as “means for” performing a specified function instead of reciting
a specific structural limitation. “An element in a claim for a combination may
be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the
recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof . . . .”1 The statute
explains that such a claim “shall be construed to cover the corresponding
structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents
thereof.”2 This possibility of extending protection beyond the disclosure to
“equivalents” suggested to the patent bar that this was the broadest way to
claim an invention. This belief was no doubt fostered by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office’s treatment of means-plus-function elements as covering all
possible means for performing the function.3 Two Federal Circuit decisions in
1987 clarified to the patent bar that rather than a catch-all for all possible
means for performing the stated function, the reference to “equivalents
thereof” in 35 U.S.C. §112, ¶ 6, is actually a limitation on the apparent broad
scope of a means-plus-function limitation.
In Pennwalt Corporation v. Durand-Wayland Inc., Pennwalt contended
“that the district court erred in interpreting the claims by going beyond the
means-plus-function language of a claim limitation and comparing the
structure in the accused devices with the structure disclosed in the
specification.”4 However, the Federal Circuit rejected this contention, and
explained that means-plus-function does not include all possible means for

* Bryan K. Wheelock, B.S.E. Duke University, J.D. Washington University in St. Louis, Bryan
Wheelock is a partner in the St. Louis Office of Harness, Dickey & Pierce, PLC, and an Adjunct
Professor of Law at Washington University in St. Louis.
** Evan R. Sotiriou, B.S.E.E. Washington University in St. Louis, J.D. Washington University in
St. Louis. Evan Sotiriou is an associate in the St. Louis Office of Armstrong Teasdale LLP.
1. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (2000).
2. Id.
3. The Patent Office persisted in this treatment until the Federal Circuit’s 1994 decision in
In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d. 1189, 29 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1845 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
4. 4 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1737, 1738 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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performing the function: “[S]ection 112, paragraph 6, rules out the possibility
that any and every means which performs the function specified in the claim
literally satisfies that limitation. While encompassing equivalents of those
disclosed in the specification, the provision, nevertheless, acts as a restriction
on the literal satisfaction of a claim limitation.”5 The Federal Circuit cited its
decision from a few months earlier in Data Line Corporation v. Micro
Technologies, Inc., where it said that Section 112 “excludes some means which
perform the specified function from literally satisfying the claim limitation.”6
While entirely consistent with the plain language of the statute, this was not
how the patent bar at large understood Section 112.
The patent bar quickly responded to this “change,” and since 1987 the use
of “means” in claims has steadily declined. As shown in Figure 1, before
1987, the use of the term “means” remained constant, appearing in the claims
of about 60% of all utility patents.7 Since 1987, the use of the term “means” in
claims has steadily declined, so that in 2002 the term “means” appeared in the
claim of less than 30% of all utility patents. In recent years, various patent bar
groups have proposed amending or even eliminating 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.
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Figure 1 Percentage of Utility Patent Claims Containing “Means”
The authors propose that even in its current form, 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6
means-plus-function claims offer several advantages that make it an important
part of comprehensive claim coverage of an invention. Part I of this article is a
5. Id. at 1739 (emphasis added).
6. 1 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 2052, 2055 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (emphasis added).
7. This is based on searches of the Patent and Trademark Office database for the total
number of utility patents, and the total number of utility patents that contain the word “means.”
The authors point out that use of the word “means” only creates a presumption that 35 U.S.C. §
112, ¶ 6 applies, but propose that use of the word “means” is a reasonable indicator of the use of
means-plus-function claiming.
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brief review of when 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 applies; Part II is a review of the
scope of protection provided by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6; Part III of this article
identifies the advantages 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 means-plus-function claims have
over other claims; and Part IV discusses how to attain those advantages.
I. APPLICATION OF 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6
The Federal Circuit has provided “a structured analysis for determining
whether the elements of a claim are in means-plus-function form.”8
“Specifically, if the word ‘means’ appears in the claim element, there is a
presumption that it is a means-plus-function element to which 35 U.S.C. § 112,
¶ 6 applies.”9 “This presumption is overcome if the claim itself recites
sufficient structure or material for performing the claimed function or when it
fails to recite a function associated with the means.”10 “Conversely, when an
element of a claim does not use the term ‘means,’ treatment as a means-plusfunction claim element is generally not appropriate.”11 “However, when it is
apparent that the element invokes purely functional terms, without the
additional recital of specific structure or material for performing that function,
the claim element may be a means-plus-function element, despite the lack of
express ‘means’ language.”12
II. SCOPE OF A MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION LIMITATIONS
A.

Literal Infringement

Literal infringement of a means-plus-function limitation under 35 U.S.C §
112, ¶ 6 requires that the accused structure perform the identical function
stated in the limitation. The patent owner first must show that the accused
device performs the exact same function specified in the means-plus-function
element.13 If the functions are not the same, then there is no literal

8. Seal-Flex Inc. v. Athletic Track and Court Construction, 50 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1225,
1233 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
9. Seal-Flex. Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1233; Sage Prod., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc.,
126 F.3d 1420, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 39 U.S.P.Q. 2d
(BNA) 1783, 1785 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
10. Seal-Flex Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1233; Sage Prods., 126 F.3d at 1427-28; York
Prods., Inc. v. Central Tractor Farm & Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
11. Seal-Flex Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1233; Mas-Hamilton Group v. LaGard, Inc., 48
U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1010, 1016-18 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
12. Seal-Flex Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1233; Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 F.3d
524, 530 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
13. Mas-Hamilton, 48 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1014 (“For literal infringement of a section
112, Para. 6 limitation, the fact-finder must determine whether the accused device performs an
identical function to the one recited in the means-plus-function clause.”).
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infringement.14 If the functions are the same, the patent owner must then show
that the structure that performs the same function is identical to, or equivalent
to, that disclosed in the specification.15 Not every structure that performs the
claimed function infringes.16 “The literal scope of a properly construed meansplus-function limitation does not extend to all means for performing a certain
function.”17
By the express terms of the statute, a means-plus-function claim is not
limited to the specific structure disclosed in the specification.18 The statute
guarantees the patentee some scope of equivalents to the structure disclosed
specification. “Drafters of means-plus-function claim limitations are statutorily
guaranteed a range of equivalents extending beyond that which is explicitly
disclosed in the patent document itself.”19 “To interpret ‘means plus function’
limitations as limited to a particular means set forth in the specification would
be to nullify the provision of § 112 requiring that the limitation shall be

14. IMS Technology Inc. v. Haas Automation Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1129, 1133 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (“If the identical function is performed, the next step is to determine whether the
accused device uses the same structure, materials, or acts found in the specification, or their
equivalents.”); General Electric Co. v. Nintendo Co., 50 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1910, 1913 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (“Where the function is different there is no literal infringement, but there can be
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.”); Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand Wayland Inc., 4
U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1737, 1739 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“If the required function is not performed
exactly in the accused device, it must be borne in mind that section 112, paragraph 6, equivalency
is not involved. Section 112, paragraph 6, plays no role in determining whether an equivalent
function is performed by the accused device under the doctrine of equivalents.”).
15. Pennwalt Corp., 4 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1739 (“Where the issue is raised, it is part of
the ultimate burden of proof of the patent owner to establish, with respect to a claim limitation in
means-plus-function form, that the structure in the accused device which performs that function is
the same as or an equivalent of the structure disclosed in the specification.”); Mas-Hamilton, 48
U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1014 (“If the identical function is performed, the fact-finder must then
determine whether the accused device utilizes the same structure or materials as described in the
specification, or their equivalents.”); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech. Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA)
1169, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“If the identical function is performed, the fact finder must then
determine whether the accused device utilizes the same structure or materials as described in the
specification, or their equivalents.”).
16. Data Line Corp. v. Micro Tech., Inc., 1 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 2052, 2055 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(“Congress has provided this statute as a specific instruction on interpretation of this type of
claim which otherwise might be held to be indefinite. Thus, the provision excludes some means
which perform the specified function from literally satisfying the claim limitation.”).
17. J&M Corp. v. Harley-Davidson Inc., 269 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
18. Palumbo et al. v. Don-Joy Co., 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 5, 8 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“The statute
expressly states that the patentee is entitled to a claim covering equivalents as well as the
specified structure, material or acts.”); Data Line Corp., 1 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 2055 (“On the
other hand, the provision precludes an interpretation that construes the means-plus-function
limitation to cover only the means disclosed in the specification.”).
19. McGinley v. Franklin Sports Inc., 60 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1001, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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construed to cover the structure described in the specification and equivalents
thereof.”20 The scope of literal infringement is illustrated in Figure 2:
All means for performing
the specified function
Equivalents to the structure
for performing the specified
function
Literal
Infringement

Structure for performing
the specified function

Figure 2 Literal Infringement Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6
As illustrated in Figure 2, there is a gap between all possible means for
performing a specified function, and the coverage of a means-plus-function
element. The inventor has some ability to close this gap by disclosing
additional structures for performing the specified function. This is illustrated
in Figure 3, where the addition of alternate structures for performing the
specified function, and the resulting expansion of the equivalents to the
disclosed structures, covers a larger portion of all possible means for
performing the specified function.
All means for performing
the specified function
Equivalents to the structures
for performing the specified
function
Literal
Infringement

Structures for performing
the specified function

Figure 3 Literal Infringement Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6

20. Palumbo, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 8 (emphasis added); D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 225
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 236, 238 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“To interpret ‘means plus function’ limitations as
limited to a particular means set forth in the specification would nullify the provision of §112
requiring that the limitation shall be construed to cover the structure described in the specification
and equivalents thereof.”).
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Whether a structure is equivalent to the disclosed structure for purposes of
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 is a question of fact.21 The statute provides no guidance
as to what is equivalent, nor does the statutory history. However, “equivalent”
is a term which has significance in other contexts in patent law—namely in the
Doctrine of Equivalents. Thus, while decisions construing equivalents under
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 state that equivalents under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 are
different from equivalents under the Doctrine of Equivalents22 these decisions
frequently borrow from Doctrine of Equivalents analyses.23 The Supreme
Court acknowledged distinctions between equivalents as used in 35 U.S.C. §
112, ¶ 6 and the Doctrine of Equivalents in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton
Davis Chemical Co., stating that “equivalents under Section 112, Paragraph 6
is an application of the doctrine of equivalents in a restrictive role, narrowing
the application of broad literal claim elements.”24
“The fact that [Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products
Co.]25 preceded the 1952 Patent Act by two years and the last paragraph of §

21. Asyst Technologies Inc. v. Empak Inc., 60 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1567 (Fed. Cir. 2001);
Odetics Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 51 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1225, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(“Whether an accused device infringes a Section 112, Para. 6 claim as an equivalent is a question
of fact.”); King Instrument Corporation v. Otari Corp., 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 402 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(“The scope of such equivalents is a question of fact, and once the accused device is found to be
an equivalent under § 112 then literal infringement has properly been established.”); Palumbo,
226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 8 (“Whether that accused device is a § 112 equivalent of the described
embodiment is a question of fact.”).
22. Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(“This court has on several occasions explicated the distinctions between the term ‘equivalents’,
found in Section 112, Para. 6 and the doctrine of equivalents.” (citing Valmont Indus., Inc. v.
Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2. 1039, 1042-44 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts v.
Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 1310; Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 102 F.3d
1214, 1222 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Dawn Equip. Co. v. Kentucky Farms Inc., 140 F.3d 1009, 1018-23
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (Plager, J., additional views) (Newman, J., additional views) (Michel, J.,
additional views).
23. IMS Technology Inc. v. Haas Automation Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1129, 1138 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (“While acknowledging that there are differences between Section 112, Para. 6 and the
doctrine of equivalents, this court on several occasions has indicated that the tests for equivalence
under Section 112, Para. 6 and the doctrine of equivalents are closely related, involving similar
analyses of insubstantiality of the differences.); De Graffenried v. U.S., 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA)
1321, 1339 (Ct. Cl. 1990) (“It is appreciated that applying the doctrine of equivalence is distinct
from determining literal infringement of a claim using means plus function language under 35
U.S.C. §112. But in using the term ‘equivalents’ in Section 112, Congress intended to reference
the Graver Tank concepts of equivalence.”); Palumbo, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 5, 8, n.4 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (“Although, as we pointed out in D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., supra, there is a difference
between a doctrine-of-equivalents analysis and a literal infringement analysis involving
‘equivalents’ under § 112, Graver Tank concepts of equivalents are relevant in any ‘equivalents’
determination.”).
24. 520 U.S. 17, 27 (1997).
25. 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).
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112 was new, see Reviser’s Note, 35 U.S.C. § 112, H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1952), suggests that the underlying principles of
equivalents in Graver Tank could be used in a § 112 literal infringement
analysis.”26 In cases such as Kemco Sales Inc. v. Control Papers Co.,27 the
Federal Circuit has applied a modified version of the Graver Tank famed
tripartite function-way-result test: “Under a modified version of the functionway-result methodology described in [Graver Tank], two structures may be
‘equivalent’ for purposes of section 112, paragraph 6 if they perform the
identical function, in substantially the same way, with substantially the same
result.”28 In cases such as Palumbo et al. v. Don Joy Co. et al.,29 the Federal
Circuit has referenced the known interchangability test from Graver Tank: “An
important factor [in the determination of equivalents] is whether persons
reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the interchangeability of an
ingredient not contained in the patent with one that was.”30 However, the
known interchangeability test is not dispositive. As the Federal Circuit noted
in Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts Inc. v. Cardinal Industries Inc.: 31
Almost by definition, two structures that perform the same function may be
substituted for one another. The question of known interchangeability is not
whether both structures serve the same function, but whether it was known that
one structure was an equivalent of another. Moreover, a finding of known

26. Palumbo, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 11 n.4; Accord Hale Fire Pump Co. v. Tokai, 614 F.2d
1278 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (applying the Graver Tank concepts of equivalents in construing a “means”
clause); Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 553 F.2d 69 (Ct. C1. 1977) (Graver Tank
interchangeability test used in interpreting a “means plus function” claim for literal infringement
purposes).
27. 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
28. Kemco Sales Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1315; Smiths Indus. Med. Sys. Inc. v. Vital
Signs Inc., 51 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1415, 1422 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“For an accused structure to
be an equivalent under section 112, Para. ¶6, however, it must both have an equivalent structure
and also perform the identical function as that recited in the claim language.”). See also Odetics
Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 51 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1225, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“As we noted
above, such a limitation is literally met by structure, materials, or acts in the accused device that
perform the claimed function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same
result.”); IMS Tech., 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1129 (“Thus, a reduced version of the well-known
tripartite test for the doctrine of equivalents has been applied in the Section 112, Para. 6 context to
determine if the differences are insubstantial, i.e., after determining that the accused device
performs the identical function, as required by statute, whether it performs the function in
substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same result.”).
29. Palumbo, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 8.
30. Id. (citing Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609; IMS Tech., 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1129
(“Evidence of known interchangeability between structure in the accused device and the disclosed
structure has also been considered an important factor.”).
31. 145 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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interchangeability, while an important factor in determining equivalence, is
certainly not dispositive.32

As with the Doctrine of Equivalents, the ultimate focus of equivalents
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 is “insubstantial differences.”33 “In order for an
accused structure to literally meet a section 112, paragraph 6 means-plusfunction limitation, the accused structure must either be the same as the
disclosed structure or be a section 112, paragraph 6 ‘equivalent,’ i.e., (1)
perform the identical function and (2) be otherwise insubstantially different
with respect to structure.”34 In the context of section 112, an equivalent results
from an insubstantial change that adds nothing of significance to the structure,
material, or acts disclosed in the patent specification.35
“In some cases, an analysis of insubstantial differences in the context of
the invention results in a finding of equivalence under Section 112, Para. 6
even though two structures arguably would not be considered equivalent
structures in other contexts, e.g., if performing functions other than the claimed
function.”36 “In any event, however, the term ‘equivalent’ in Section 112
should not be interpreted as being limited to structures that are ‘equivalent’ to
the physical structure of the ‘means’ disclosed in a patent.”37 “The literal
wording of Section 112 contains no such requirement, it merely refers to
structures ‘described in the specification and equivalents thereof.’ The statute
does not state that the only possible ‘equivalents’ to the structures described in
the specification are devices with equivalent physical structures.”38 Limiting
literal infringement of “means plus function” claims to objects that have
physical structure equivalent to those objects specifically described in the
patent specification would seriously undermine the usefulness of such claims.39

32. Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d at 1309.
33. Id. (“The proper test is whether the differences between the structure in the accused
device and any disclosed in the specification are insubstantial.”); Alpex Computer Corp. v.
Nintendo Co., 102 F.3d 1214, 1222 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that equivalents under Section 112,
Para. 6, and under the doctrine of equivalents both relate to insubstantial changes); Valmont
Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1043 (“In the context of section 112, however, an
equivalent results from an insubstantial change which adds nothing of significance to the
structure, material, or acts disclosed in the patent specification.”).
34. Kemco Sales Inc. v. Control Papers Co., 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1308, 1315 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
35. Valmont Industries Inc., 25 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1455.
36. IMS Tech. Inc. v. Haas Automation, Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1129, 1139 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
37. De Graffenried v. U.S., 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1321, 1339 (Ct. Cl. 1990).
38. IMS Tech., 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1138. (“Indeed, the statute requires two structures to be
equivalent, but it does not require them to be “structurally equivalent,” i.e., it does not mandate an
equivalency comparison that necessarily focuses heavily or exclusively on physical structure.”);
De Graffenried, 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1339.
39. Id.
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“Under such an interpretation, literal infringement of a claim may be avoided
simply by replacing the structures specifically described in the patent
specification with known functional equivalents that operate in substantially
the same way but have fundamentally different structures.”40
The “all elements” rule of the Doctrine of Equivalents does not apply to
equivalents under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.41 A 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 equivalent
does not have to have an equivalent to each element of structure disclosed in
the specification. “The individual components, if any, of an overall structure
that corresponds to the claimed function are not claim limitations. Rather, the
claim limitation is the overall structure corresponding to the claimed
function.”42 Thus, “structures with different numbers of parts may still be
equivalent under Section 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, thereby meeting the claim
limitation.”43
The context of the invention should be considered when considering
equivalence under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. “[W]hen in a claimed ‘means’
limitation the disclosed physical structure is of little or no importance to the
claimed invention, there may be a broader range of equivalent structures than if
the physical characteristics of the structure are critical in performing the
claimed function in the context of the claimed invention.”44
Timing is important in identifying equivalents under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.
A structural equivalent under § 112 must have been available at the time of the
issuance of the claim, and cannot embrace technology developed after the
issuance of the patent because the literal meaning of a claim is fixed upon its
issuance.45
As with any claim, in construing a means-plus-function claim, a number of
factors may be considered, including the language of the claim, the patent
specification, the prosecution history of the patent, other claims in the patent,
and expert testimony.46 “The specification is particularly important to the
40. Id.
41. Odetics Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 51 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA)1225, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. IMS Tech. Inc. v. Haas Automation, Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1225, 1138 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
45. Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
46. King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 402, 408 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(“As an aid for ascertaining the breadth of equivalents under § 112, a number of factors may be
considered: the patent specification, the prosecution history of the patent, other claims in the
patent, and expert testimony.”); See also Palumbo et al. v. Don-Joy Co. et al., 226 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 5, 8 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“In construing a ‘means plus function’ claim, as also other types of
claims, a number of factors may be considered, including the language of the claim, the patent
specification, the prosecution history of the patent, other claims in the patent, and expert
testimony . . . . Once such factors are weighed, the scope of the ‘means’ claim may be
determined.”); Intel Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 20 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1161, 1179-80 (Fed.
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construction of this limitation, because under section 112, paragraph 6, the
corresponding structure described in the specification must be read into a
means-plus-function limitation.”47 “The court must construe the limitation to
cover only the structures described in the specification or their equivalents.”48
“Statements made during the prosecution relating to structures disclosed in
the specification are certainly relevant to determining the meaning of the
means-plus-function limitations of the claims at issue.”49 The patentee can
limit the scope of “equivalents” by disclaiming them in the application or
during prosecution. Thus, when a patentee states that a particular structure
does not perform the required function, it is not surprising that the patentee
will not be permitted to claim that that structure is an “equivalent” for 35
U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 purposes.50 “If an applicant specifically distinguishes a
structure from what is claimed during prosecution, the applicant will be
estopped from asserting a scope for the same claim that covers that
structure.”51 This frequently occurs in the context of detailing shortcomings of
the relevant prior art.52
“Although under the doctrine of equivalents prior art restricts the extent to
which patent protection can be equitably extended beyond the claims to cover
an accused device, the policies underlying that concept are not served by

Cir. 1991) (“Thus, under section 112, paragraph 6, the aids for determining a structural equivalent
to the structure disclosed in the patent specification are the same as those used in interpreting any
other type of claim language, namely, the specification, the prosecution history, other claims in
the patent, and expert testimony.”); Davies v. U.S., 35 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1027, 1031 (Ct.Cl.
1994) (“To construe a means-plus-function limitation such as this, the court may look to various
factors, as it would in construing any other claim . . . . These factors include the claim itself, the
specification, and the prosecution history.”).
47. Davies, 35 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1027.
48. Id.
49. Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co. Ltd., 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1667, 1672 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
50. Signtech USA Ltd. v. Vutek Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(“Furthermore, by stating that the accused structure was ‘incapable’ of achieving the desired
results of the invention, the patentee expressly excluded it as an equivalent of the disclosed
structure.”).
51. Alpex Computer Corp., 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1672.
52. Ballard Med. Prod. v. Allegiance Healthcare Corp., 60 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1493 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (“An inventor may use the specification and prosecution history to define what his
invention is and what it is not—particularly when distinguishing the invention over prior art.
‘[J]ust as prosecution history estoppel may act to estop an equivalence argument under the
doctrine of equivalents, positions taken before the PTO may bar an inconsistent position on claim
construction under § 112, 6.’”) (citing Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA)
1169, 1175 (Fed. Cir. 1998)); Signtech USA, 50 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1372 (statements that a
prior art structure was “incapable” of achieving the desired results of the invention held to be an
“explicit disavowal of prior art structure, which was properly used in construing the means-plusfunction claims.”).
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restricting claim limitations in the same manner.”53 Thus, 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6
equivalents are generally not limited by the prior art.54 “Even if the prior art
discloses the same or an equivalent structure, the claim will not be limited in
scope thereby. It is only necessary to determine what is an equivalent to the
structure disclosed in the specification which is performing the function at
issue.”55
B.

Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents

In addition to protection against literal infringement, in appropriate cases,
even a means-plus-function limitation appears to be entitled to expansion
under the Doctrine of Equivalents. The Doctrine of Equivalents can expand
the scope of a means-plus-function limitation in two ways. First, while
equivalents under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 is limited to structures that perform the
identical function, the Doctrine of Equivalents can encompass structures that
perform substantially the same function. This is illustrated in Figure 4:

53. Intel Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 20 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1161, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
54. Intel Corp., 20 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1179 (“It is not necessary to consider the prior art
in applying section 112, paragraph 6. Even if the prior art discloses the same or an equivalent
structure, the claim will not be limited in scope thereby. It is only necessary to determine what is
an equivalent to the structure disclosed in the specification which is performing the function at
issue.”); Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co. Ltd., 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1667, 1672 n.7
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (“The claims at issue contain limitations expressed in “means-plus-function”
format. The court’s ruling is consistent with the rule that [i]t is not necessary to consider the prior
art in applying section 112, paragraph 6. Even if the prior art discloses the same or an equivalent
structure, the claim will not be limited in scope thereby.”) (citations omitted).
55. Intel Corp., 20 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1179.
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All means for performing
substantially the same function
Doctrine of Equivalents
equivalent means for
performing substantially
the same function
All means for
performing function
Equivalents to specified
means for performing
function
Specified means for
performing function

FIGURE 4 LITERAL INFRINGEMENT OF MEANS-PLUS FUNCTION ELEMENT
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
The Doctrine of Equivalents does not extend to structures that perform the
identical function, but are not equivalents for purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6
unless the accused structures did not exist at the time the patent issued. This is
shown in Figure 5:
All means for performing
substantially the same function
Doctrine of Equivalents of means
for performing function

Literal
Infringement

All means for performing
function
Equivalents to structure for
performing specified function
Structure for performing
specified function

Infringing
Equivalents

Figure 5 Literal Infringement of means-plus function element under the
Doctrine of Equivalents
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“If an accused structure is not a section 112, paragraph 6 equivalent of the
disclosed structure because it does not perform the identical function of that
disclosed structure and hence does not literally infringe, it may nevertheless
still be an ‘equivalent’ under the doctrine of equivalents.”56 “A key feature
that distinguishes ‘equivalents’” under section 112, paragraph 6 and
‘equivalents’ under the doctrine of equivalents is that section 112, paragraph 6
equivalents must perform the identical function of the disclosed structure, . . .
while equivalents under the doctrine of equivalents need only perform a
substantially similar function . . . .”57 “Furthermore, under Section 112, Para.
6, the accused device must perform the identical function as recited in the
claim element while the doctrine of equivalents may be satisfied when the
function performed by the accused device is only substantially the same.”58
“Thus, if one applies the traditional function-way-result test, often referred to
as the tripartite test, the accused structure must perform substantially the same
function, in substantially the same way, to achieve substantially the same
result, as the disclosed structure.”59 The tripartite test developed for the
Doctrine of Equivalents, thus, is not wholly transferable to an analysis of
equivalents under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 resulting from the functional identity
requirement, and requires the application of a modified function-way-result
analysis.60
Further, because the “way” and “result” prongs are the same under the
section 112, paragraph 6 and Doctrine of Equivalents tests, a structure failing
the section 112, paragraph 6 test under either or both prongs also fails the
Doctrine of Equivalents test for the same reasons.61 Therefore, when a court
determines that the “way” or “result” is substantially different under a section
112, paragraph 6 equivalents analysis, a patentee cannot prevail under the
Doctrine of Equivalents.62
“However, when a finding of noninfringement under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
paragraph 6, is premised on an absence of identical function, then infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents is not thereby automatically precluded.”63
“That is because infringement under the doctrine of equivalents may be
premised on the accused and the patented component having substantially the

56. Kemco Sales Inc. v. Control Papers Co., 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1308, 1315 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
57. Kemco Sales Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1316.
58. Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
59. Kemco Sales Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1316.
60. Id. (citing Odetics Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 51 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1225, 1229-30
(Fed. Cir. 1999)).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite Pictures Inc., 61 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1152, 1160
(Fed. Cir. 2001).
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same function, whereas structure corresponding to the disclosed limitation in a
means-plus-function clause must perform the identical function.”64 Thus, a
patent claim may be infringed if an element of the infringing device is only
substantially the same as a limitation of the patent claim. 65
“One important difference between Section 112, Para. 6 and the doctrine of
equivalents involves the timing of the separate analyses for an “insubstantial
change.’”66 “As this court has recently clarified, a structural equivalent under
Section 112 must have been available at the time of the issuance of the
claim.”67 “An equivalent structure or act under Section 112 cannot embrace
technology developed after the issuance of the patent because the literal
meaning of a claim is fixed upon its issuance.”68 “An ‘after arising equivalent’
infringes, if at all, under the doctrine of equivalents.”69 Therefore, a finding
that a component of an accused product is not a structure “equivalent” to the
corresponding structure of a means-plus-function limitation for purposes of
literal infringement analysis precludes a finding that the same structure is
equivalent for purposes of the Doctrine of Equivalents, unless the component
constitutes technology arising after the issuance of the patent.70 The Doctrine
of Equivalents, thus, “might come into play to determine infringement of a
means-plus-function claim element if the accused device features technology
that has arisen since the time of the patent issuance.”71 In such a case, the
insubstantial difference analysis determines infringement and requires a
comparison of the structure corresponding to the function (i.e., the literal
meaning of the claim element) with the accused structure. 72
“Thus, the temporal difference between patent issuance and infringement
distinguish an equivalent under Section 112 from an equivalent under the
doctrine of equivalents.”73 “In other words, an equivalent structure or act

64. Interactive Pictures Corp., 61 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1160.
65. Id. at 1161 (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17,
29 (1997)). The court has upheld determinations of equivalence on the ground that hardware and
software implementations of a component of an invention are interchangeable substitutes, even
though such a substitution would require ancillary changes in affected circuitry and packaging.
Thus, rather than focusing on physical or electronic compatibility, the known interchangeability
test looks to the knowledge of a skilled artisan to see whether that artisan would contemplate the
interchange as a design choice. Id. (citing Overhead Door Corp. v. Chamberlain Group Inc., 194
F.3d 1261, 1269-70 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
66. Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite Pictures, Inc., 61 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1152, 1160
(Fed. Cir. 2001).
71. Ishida Co. Ltd. v. Taylor, 55 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1449, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
72. Ishida Co. Ltd., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453.
73. Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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under Section 112 for literal infringement must have been available at the time
of patent issuance while an equivalent under the doctrine of equivalents may
arise after patent issuance and before the time of infringement.”74 “An ‘afterarising’ technology could thus infringe under the doctrine of equivalents
without infringing literally as a Section 112, Para. 6 equivalent.”75
Additionally, “[a]lthough Section 112, Para. 6 and the doctrine of
equivalents are different in purpose and administration, ‘a finding of a lack of
literal infringement for lack of equivalent structure under a means-plusfunction limitation may preclude a finding of equivalence under the doctrine of
equivalents.’”76 “Both equivalence analyses, after all, apply ‘similar analyses
of insubstantiality of the differences.’”77 “This confluence occurs because
infringement requires, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, that
the accused product or process incorporate each limitation of the claimed
invention.”78 “Therefore, if an accused product or process performs the
identical function and yet avoids literal infringement for lack of a Section 112,
Para. 6 structural equivalent, it may well fail to infringe the same functional
element under the doctrine of equivalents.”79 “This same reasoning may be
applied in reverse in certain circumstances. Where, as here, there is identity of
function and no after-arising technology, a means-plus-function claim element
that is found to be infringed only under the doctrine of equivalents due to a
jury instruction failing to instruct on Section 112, Para. 6 structural equivalents
is also literally present in the accused device.”80 However, “where the claim of
infringement under section 112 paragraph 6 fails on the ground that the
accused device is not equivalent to structure disclosed in the specification, the
doctrine of equivalents is available only if, unlike this case, the accused device
represents new technology developed after the issuance of the patent.” 81
Thus, 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 recites a mandatory procedure for interpreting
the meaning of a means or step-plus-function claim element, and specifically
that these claim limitations will be construed to cover the corresponding
structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents
thereof. 82 Further, an equivalent under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 informs the claim
meaning for a literal infringement analysis. The doctrine of equivalents, on the

74. Al-Site Corp., 50 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1168.
75. Id.
76. Id. (citing Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts Inc. v. Cardinal Indus. Inc., 145 F.3d 1303,
1311 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1168.
79. Al-Site Corp., 50 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1168.
80. Id. at 1168-69.
81. Ballard Med. Prods. v. Allegiance Healthcare Corp., 60 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1493, 1502
(Fed. Cir. 2001).
82. Al-Site Corp. 50 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1168.
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other hand, extends enforcement of claim terms beyond their literal reach in
the event “there is ‘equivalence’ between the elements of the accused product
or process and the claimed elements of the patented invention.”83
Section 112, paragraph 6 procedures restrict a functional claim element’s
“broad literal language . . . to only those means that are ‘equivalent’ to the
actual means shown in the patent specification.”84 Section 112, paragraph 6
also restricts the scope of a functional claim limitation as part of a literal
infringement analysis.85 Therefore, under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, the accused
device must perform the identical function as recited in the claim element
while the Doctrine of Equivalents may be satisfied when the function
performed by the accused device is only substantially the same.86
Again, “[b]ecause the ‘way’ and ‘result’ prongs are the same under both
the section 112, paragraph 6 and doctrine of equivalents tests, a structure
failing the Section 112, Paragraph 6 test under either or both prongs must fail
the doctrine of equivalents test for the same reason(s).”87
On several occasions the statutory equivalence under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6
and the judicial Doctrine of Equivalents have been compared. 88 On these
occasions, while acknowledging that there are differences between 35 U.S.C. §
112, ¶ 6 and the Doctrine of Equivalents, the courts have indicated that the
tests for equivalence under section 112, paragraph 6 and the Doctrine of
Equivalents are “closely related,” involving “similar analyses of
insubstantiality of the differences.”89 “Thus, a reduced version of the wellknown tripartite test for the doctrine of equivalents has been applied in the
Section 112, Para. 6 context to determine if the differences are insubstantial,
i.e., after determining that the accused device performs the identical function,
as required by statute, whether it performs the function in substantially the
same way to achieve substantially the same result.”90 “Evidence of known

83. Id. (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21
(1997)).
84. Id. (citing Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 28).
85. Id. (citing Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 28).
86. Id. at 1168.
87. Kemco Sales Inc. v. Control Papers Co., 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1308, 1316 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
88. IMS Tech. Inc. v. Haas Automation Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1129, 1138 (Fed. Cir.
2000); See also, e.g., Odetics Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 185 F.3d 1259, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
Al-Site Corp., 50 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1167-68; Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts Inc. v.
Cardinal Indus. Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., 138 F.3d
1448, 1467 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Mayer, C.J., concurring); Alpex Computer Corp. v.
Nintendo Co., 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1667, 1673-74 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Valmont Indus. Inc. v.
Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1042-44 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
89. IMS Tech., Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1138 (citing Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d at 1310).
90. Id.
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interchangeability between structure in the accused device and the disclosed
structure has also been considered an important factor.”91
In light of the similarity of the tests for equivalence under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
¶ 6 and the doctrine of equivalents, the context of the invention may be
considered when performing both a section 112, paragraph 6 equivalence
analysis and a doctrine of equivalents determination.92 “As a result, two
structures that are equivalent in one environment may not be equivalent in
another.”93 “More particularly, when in a claimed ‘means’ limitation the
disclosed physical structure is of little or no importance to the claimed
invention, there may be a broader range of equivalent structures than if the
physical characteristics of the structure are critical in performing the claimed
function in the context of the claimed invention.”94 “Thus, a rigid comparison
of physical structures in a vacuum may be inappropriate in a particular case.
Indeed, the statute requires two structures to be equivalent, but it does not
require them to be ‘structurally equivalent,’ i.e., it does not mandate an
equivalency comparison that necessarily focuses heavily or exclusively on
physical structure.”95 “In some cases, an analysis of insubstantial differences
in the context of the invention results in a finding of equivalence under Section
112, Paragraph 6 even though two structures arguably would not be considered
equivalent structures in other contexts, e.g., if performing functions other than
the claimed function.”96
However, the similar analysis of equivalents under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6
and the Doctrine of Equivalents does not, however, lead to the conclusion that
a component-by-component analysis of structural equivalence under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, ¶ 6 is performed.97 Although, each element contained in a patent claim
is material to determining the scope of the patented invention.98 Thus, a claim
limitation written in 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 form, like all claim limitations, must
be met, literally or equivalently, for a finding of infringement.99 Such a
limitation is literally met by structure, materials, or acts in the accused device
that perform the claimed function in substantially the same way to achieve
substantially the same result.100 The individual components, if any, of an
overall structure that corresponds to the claimed function are not claim

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
1999).
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id.
Id.
IMS Tech., Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1138.
Id.
Id.
Odetics Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 51 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1225, 1229-30 (Fed. Cir.
Odetics Inc., 51 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1229-30.
Id.
Id.
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limitations.101
Rather, the claim limitation is the overall structure
corresponding to the claimed function.102 This is why structures with different
numbers of parts may still be equivalent under 35 U.S.C. §112, ¶6, thereby
meeting the claim limitation.103 The appropriate degree of specificity is
provided by the statute itself and the relevant structure is that which
‘corresponds’ to the claimed function.104 Thus, deconstruction or parsing (i.e.,
component-by-component analysis) is improper in a 35 U.S.C. §112, ¶6
analysis, unlike the Doctrine of Equivalents analysis. 105
“The doctrine of equivalents has a different purpose and application than
section 112 . . . [and] prevents a copyist from evading patent claims with
insubstantial changes.”106 “An equivalent under the doctrine of equivalents
results from an insubstantial change which, from the perspective of one of
ordinary skill in the art, adds nothing of significance to the claimed
invention.”107 “An equivalent under the doctrine of equivalents, though not
literally meeting the claims, still infringes the patent.”108 “The doctrine of
equivalents involves the familiar three-part inquiry . . . : an accused device
[that] performs substantially the same overall function or work, in substantially
the same way, to obtain substantially the same overall result as the claimed
invention.” 109
Thus, equivalents under the Doctrine of Equivalents should not be
confused with the use of the word “equivalent” in Section 112.110 “In applying
the doctrine of equivalents, the fact finder must determine the range of
equivalents to which the claimed invention is entitled, in light of the
prosecution history, the pioneer-non-pioneer status of the invention, and the
prior art. It must then be determined whether the entirety of the accused device
or process is so ‘substantially the same thing, used in substantially the same

101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Odetics Inc., 51 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1229-30.
104. Id.
105. Id. See also Caterpillar Inc. v. Deere & Co., 56 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1305, 1310 (Fed.
Cir. 2000). (“The individual components, if any, of an overall structure that corresponds to the
claimed function are not claim limitations. Rather, the claim limitation is the overall structure
corresponding to the claimed function.” Odetics Inc., 51 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1230. Therefore,
the district court conducted an impermissible component-by-component analysis to determine
that no reasonable jury could find structural equivalence.).
106. Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., Inc., 983 F.2d 1039, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
107. Valmont Indus., Inc. 983 F.2d at 1043.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1039 (citing Penwalt Corp. v. Durand Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934 (Fed. Cir.
1987)).
110. Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm., 20 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1161, 179 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
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way, to achieve substantially the same result’ as to fall within that range”111 as
opposed to “in a ‘means plus function’ analysis wherein the sole question is
whether the single means in the accused device which performs the function
stated in the claim is the same as or an equivalent of the corresponding
structure described in the patentee’s specification as performing that
function.”112 Further, “prior art is considered in the context of a doctrine of
equivalents analysis to ensure that “the patent holder does not obtain a broader
right to exclude under that doctrine than could have been obtained from the
patent office.”113 “Although under the doctrine of equivalents prior art restricts
the extent to which patent protection can be equitably extended beyond the
claims to cover an accused device, the policies underlying that concept are not
served by restricting claim limitations in the same manner. Claim limitations
may, and often do, read on the prior art, particularly in combination
patents.”114
C. An Equivalent of an Equivalent
The question, as raised by Judge Plager in Dawn Equipment Co. v.
Kentucky Farms Inc., is there “something called an equivalent of an
equivalent?” 115 Although the Federal Circuit has addressed the difference
between analysis of equivalents under a 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 framework and
under a Doctrine of Equivalents framework (i.e., temporal difference), the
Court has not specifically addressed whether an equivalent of an equivalent
may be found. The Court has suggested that “title 35 will not produce an
‘equivalent of an equivalent’ by applying both Section 112, Para. 6 and the
doctrine of equivalents to the structure of a given claim element.”116 However,
there appears to be no clear answer to this question, and as Judge Plager stated
in Dawn Equipment, “I write additionally because I find the law in this area
confused and confusing.”117
The authors submit that an equivalent of an equivalent should be allowed.
As discussed herein, many federal circuit cases have held that the test for an
equivalent under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 and under the Doctrine of Equivalents,
although similar, are different. It is also well settled that each of these tests
may be applied to the same means-plus-function claim to determine an
equivalent. Therefore, the authors submit that if a patentee is entitled to
equivalents under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, and a determination under the Doctrine
111. Intel Corp., 20 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1179 (quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde
Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950)).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 140 F.3d 1009, 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
116. Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1161, 1177 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
117. Dawn Equipment, 140 F.3d at 1018.
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of Equivalents requires a determination of whether an accused device has an
equivalent structure, such a determination must necessarily include a
determination of whether the equivalent structure under the Doctrine or
Equivalents is equivalent to not only the various embodiments of the disclosed
invention, but equivalents thereof as guaranteed and required by section 112,
paragraph 6. To do otherwise would frustrate Congress’ intent to allow a
patentee to use means-plus-function claiming to encompass equivalents
thereof.
Thus, the authors suggest that this is another consideration for claim
drafters when drafting claims.
D. Application of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 to “Step For” Recitations
“An element of a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or
step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure,
material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover
the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and
equivalents thereof.”118 This statutory provision applies to a combination of
mechanical elements, as well as to a “combination of . . . steps in a process
claim.”119 As discussed herein, “the use of the word ‘means’ to describe a
claim limitation ‘gives rise to a presumption that the inventor used the term
advisedly to invoke the statutory mandates for means-plus-function
clauses.’”120 “Similarly, in the context of method claims, the use of the term
‘steps for’ signals the drafter’s intent to invoke §112, paragraph 6.”121 Section
112, paragraph 6 only applies, however, ‘when steps plus function without acts
are present.’”122
Similar to using ‘means for’ language, ‘[w]here the claim drafter has not
signaled an intent to invoke § 112, paragraph 6 by using the ‘steps for’
language, [the courts] are unwilling to resort to that provision to constrain the
scope of coverage of a claim limitation without a showing that the limitation
contains nothing that can be construed as an act.”123 This is because “[m]ethod
claims are commonly drafted using the phrase ‘steps of’ followed by a list of
the steps comprising the method claimed.”124 Thus, “[a]n application of § 112,
paragraph 6 [in any case where ‘steps of’ is used] would render the scope of
coverage of these method claims uncertain and disrupt patentees’ settled
118. Masco Corp. v. U.S., 303 F.3d 1316, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
119. Masco Corp., 303 F.3d at 1326 (citing O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 1576, 1582,
(Fed. Cir. 1997).
120. Masco Corp., 303 F.3d at 1326 (quoting Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126
F.3d 1420, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
121. Id.
122. Id. (citing O.I. Corp., 115 F.3d at 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1997)) (emphasis added).
123. Masco Corp., 303 F.3d at 1327.
124. Id.
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expectations regarding the scope of their claims.”125 Therefore, for a method
claim, § 112, paragraph 6 is implicated only when steps-plus-function are
recited without acts and “[m]erely claiming a step by itself, or a series of steps,
without recital of a function does not trigger the application of § 112,
paragraph 6.”126
It should be noted that “method claims that ‘parallel,’ or have limitations
similar to, apparatus claims admittedly subject to section 112, paragraph 6 are
not necessarily subject to the requirements of § 112, paragraph 6.”127 A review
of each claim must be performed to determine if the specific claim falls within
the scope of section 112, paragraph 6.128 Further, a statement of purpose in the
preamble to a claim does not necessarily provide the necessary function for a
step-plus-function form.129
Thus, with “the parallel format of [35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6], a similar analysis
applies to [both means-plus] and step-plus-function claim elements.”130 For
example, certain phrases may trigger a presumption that a claim is to be
construed under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.131 However, other recitations of the
element in the claim, “such as the recitation of a specific act, may overcome
the presumption.”132
Further, “claim interpretation focuses on what the claim limitation
accomplishes, i.e., it’s underlying function, in relation to what is accomplished
by the other limitations and the claim as a whole.”133 “If a claim element
recites only an underlying function without acts for performing it, then Section
112, Para. 6 applies even without express step-plus-function language.”134 A
similar analysis for determining whether Section 112, Paragraph. 6 is invoked
thereby applies to means-plus-function claims and step-plus-function claims.
That is, “[I]f the claim element uses the phrase ‘step for,’ then Section 112,
Para. 6 is presumed to apply.”135 Further, and consistent with analysis of
means-for recitations under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, step-for recitation covers
“only the specific acts recited in the specification for performing that function,
and equivalent acts.”136 Further, it should be noted that 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 is
“drafted with the permissive ‘may’ [modifying the step-plus language and
125. Id.
126. Epcon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc., 279 F.3d 1022, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track and Court Construction, 50 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1225,
1233 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Seal-Flex Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1234 (Rader, J., concurring).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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therefore] the statute does not require that steps in a method claim be drafted in
step-plus-function form, but rather allows for that form.”137 Thus, “[m]erely
claiming a step without recital of a function is not analogous to a means plus a
function.”138
III. ADVANTAGES OF MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION CLAIMING
A.

Convenience

Sometimes an element of an invention is easier to describe by what it does
than what it is. “By specifically authorizing the use of ‘means plus function’
terminology, Congress apparently recognized that such terminology can be a
highly efficient way to draft a patent claim, i.e., to define the metes and bounds
of the patentee’s invention.”139 As the Federal Circuit stated in O.I.
Corporation v. Tekmar Co., “Section 112, Para. 6, as is well-documented, was
intended to permit use of means expressions without recitation of all the
possible means that might be used in a claimed apparatus.”140 While this
convenience comes at a price,141 means-plus-function claiming nonetheless
provides a simple way to protect the structures disclosed in the specification,
and some range equivalents beyond what was actually disclosed.
B.

Narrow Scope

The Federal Circuit has said that the scope of a means-plus-function
element “is sharply limited to the structure disclosed in the specification and its
equivalents.”142 The very feature that has driven away most practitioners—
narrow scope—is a principal benefit of section 112, paragraph 6. In an
infringement suit, the patentee wants the narrowest claim that is still infringed.
Comprehensively claiming an invention includes drafting claims of varying
scope, and to the extent that a means-plus-function element is narrowly
construed, it is more likely to survive a validity challenge.

137. O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
138. O.I. Corp., 115 F.3d at 1583.
139. De Graffenried v. U.S., 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1321, 1339 (Ct. Cl. 1990).
140. O.I. Corp., 115 F.3d at 1583. See also B. Braun Med. Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 124 F.3d
1419, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (referring to the convenience of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6).
141. “The price that must be paid for use of that convenience is limitation of the claim to the
means specified in the written description and equivalents thereof.” O.I. Corp., 115 F.3d at 1583.
142. J&M Corp. v. Harley-Davidson Inc., 269 F.3d. 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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C. Lack of Clarity
The difficulty143 in construing means-plus-function elements is sometimes
cited as a reason to avoid them. However, given the presumption of validity,
uncertainty is at least advantageous to the patent owner as an accused infringer
and is probably more advantageous to the patent owner. A claim of uncertain
scope can be a powerful deterrent to a competitor.
D. Safety Net for Disclosed but Unclaimed Subject Matter
Subject matter that is disclosed in an issued patent, but not covered by the
claims cannot be recaptured by the Doctrine of Equivalents. However, a
means-plus-function element is construed to cover the structure disclosed in
the specification, and if multiple embodiments are disclosed, it is deemed to
cover those multiple embodiments. Thus, judicious use of means-plusfunction elements can catch subject matter disclosed in the specification, but
not otherwise expressly claimed.
When a patent drafter discloses but does not claim subject matter, the
unclaimed subject matter is dedicated to the public.144 “Application of the
doctrine of equivalents to recapture subject matter deliberately left
unclaimed . . . ‘conflict[s] with the primacy of the claims in defining the scope
of the patentee’s exclusive right.’”145 “[A] patentee cannot narrowly claim an
invention to avoid prosecution scrutiny by the PTO, and then, after patent
issuance, use the doctrine of equivalents to establish infringement because the
specification discloses equivalents.”146 However, when drafting claims in a
means-plus-function format, the claims are more likely construed to be narrow
and allowable during prosecution, while the scope of these same claims are
entitled to equivalents under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 during an infringement
analysis. Thus, this type of claiming essentially captures equivalents of the
subject matter disclosed but not claimed.
Further, “[a] patentee who inadvertently fails to claim disclosed subject
matter, however, is not left without remedy [and] within two years from the
grant of the original patent . . . may file a reissue application [in an] attempt to
[broaden] the scope of the original claims to include the disclosed but
previously unclaimed subject matter.”147 This may include the addition of
mean-plus-function claims, and the authors suggest such claims be added if not
included in the original application. “In addition, a patentee can file a separate

143. Even federal circuit judges “find the law in this area confused and confusing.” See supra
text accompanying note 117.
144. Johnson & Johnston Assoc. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
145. Johnson, 285 F.3d at 1054 (citing Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420,
1424 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
146. Id.
147. Id.
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application claiming the disclosed [but previously unclaimed] subject matter”
(e.g., filing a continuation application claiming the disclosed subject matter
before all applications in the chain of applications issue).148
E.

Preservation of Protection of “Equivalents”

In the wake of Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,149
the application of the Doctrine of Equivalents to limitations added by
amendment is uncertain at best. However, 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 entitles the
owner of a claim with a means-plus-function element to coverage of not just
what is disclosed in the specification, but to “equivalents thereof,” without
resort to the Doctrine of Equivalents. “Moreover, the extent of equivalents
must be interpreted in light of the disclosure of the invention in the
specification, as a whole, as well as the prosecution history.”150 In J&M
Corporation v. Harley-Davidson Inc., the patent applicants determined that
their patent failed to claim the full subject matter to which they were entitled,
and sought a reissue patent to more broadly claim their invention.151 The
examiner rejected the new broader claims based upon a failure of the
specification to support the subject matter of the claims.152 The examiner
further stated that the new claims improperly introduced new matter into the
application (i.e., matter not present in the original patent).153 In response, the
“[a]pplicants cancelled the rejected claims and [drafted] new claims in meansplus-function format.”154
These claims were allowed after further
amendment.155
The claims added in means-plus-function format are statutorily entitled to
encompass all embodiments of the means recitations in the claims as disclosed
in the specification and their equivalents.156 Therefore, by using means-plusfunction claiming during prosecution, particularly when making amendments,
protection of a claimed invention will extend to the disclosed embodiments and
equivalents thereof. Thus, in J&M Corporation, the patentee was entitled to
148. Id.
149. 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
150. J&M Corp. v. Harley-Davidson Inc., 269 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2001). See also
Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Medtronic Inc. v.
Intermedics, Inc., 799 F.2d 734, 742 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co.,
102 F.3d 1214, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that the prosecution history is relevant to
determining the meaning of means-plus-function limitations); Signtech USA v. Vutek, Inc., 174
F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that a means-plus-function limitation did not cover
structure disclaimed in the specification).
151. J&M Corp., 269 F.3d at 1363.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1364.
155. Id.
156. J&M Corp., 269 F.3d at 1365.
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equivalents of embodiments of the invention as disclosed and supported in the
application as filed.157
However, in J&M Corporation, the scope of the means-plus-function
claims was limited to a single embodiment disclosed and its equivalents as a
result of the prosecution history. Thus, “the extent of equivalents must be
interpreted in light of the disclosure of the invention in the specification, as a
whole, as well as the prosecution history.”158 In J&M Corporation, the
prosecution history, including specifically the examiner’s rejection, coupled
with the applicant’s acquiescence and substitution of narrower claims, limited
the scope of the equivalents to a single embodiment of the invention disclosed
and supported by the original application as filed.159
Further, statements regarding the prior art may affect the scope of
protection.160 When faced with a rejection, acquiescence and canceling of the
rejected claims, and substituting new claims drafted in the means-plus-function
format can limit equivalents of the means-plus-function claims to a particular
embodiment.161 Careful attention should be made when responding to
examiner’s rejections, as well as amending and drafting additional claims.
Thus, even though Festo applies when a rejected claim is canceled and
replaced by a narrowing claim, thus possibly preventing application of the
Doctrine of Equivalents, if a replaced claim is drafted in means-plus-function
format, the claim is entitled to a scope covering embodiments disclosed in the
application and equivalents thereof, limited only by prosecution history.
F.

Protecting Against the Undesired Application of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6

Another reason to employ means-plus-function claiming is to make sure
that specification contains sufficient disclosure to support functional claims.
There is an increasing risk that a functional limitation—even those that do not
contain the term “means”—will be determined to fall under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶
6. By preparing the specification to support means-plus-function claims, the
patentee is protected from the interpretation of limitations as means-plusfunction limitation.

157. Id.
158. Id. at 1367. See also Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 102 F.3d 1214, 1220 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (holding that the prosecution history is relevant to determining the meaning of meansplus-function limitations); Signtech USA v. Vutek, Inc., 174 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(holding that a means-plus-function limitation did not cover structure disclaimed in the
specification).
159. J&M Corp., 269 F.3d at 1367-68.
160. Id. at 1368.
161. Id. at 1366.
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G. Different Decision Makers
Many of the issues surrounding infringement under the Doctrine of
Equivalents revolve around claim construction, which is a question of law
determined by the court. However, whether an accused structure is equivalent
to the structure corresponding to a means-plus-function element is a question
of the fact for the jury. Thus, means-plus-function elements can give the
patentee the opportunity to try equivalence issues before both a jury and the
judge.
“[D]etermination of infringement under § 112 ¶ 6 is a factual question.”162
“Whether an accused device or method infringes a claim with a Section 112, P.
6 limitation, i.e., whether it performs the identical function with the same
structure, materials, or acts described in the specification or an equivalent
thereof, is a question of fact.”163 Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Technology
Corporation164 indicated that the holding in Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc.165 (that claim construction is a question of law) did not affect Palumbo,
which held that whether an accused device is a section 112, paragraph 6
equivalent is a question of fact.
More particularly, under a 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 framework:
“After the judge construes the means-plus-function limitations identifying
structures, materials, or acts described in the patent’s specification, and their
equivalents as determined by the fact finder [i.e., the jury] . . . the judge gives
the construed claims to the fact finder . . . for a determination of infringement.
For literal infringement, the fact finder must determine whether the accused
device performs an identical function to the one recited in the means-plusfunction clause. . . . If the identical function is performed, the fact finder must
then determine whether the accused device utilized the same structure or
materials as described in the specification, or their equivalents.”166

“[T]he analytical effect of statements made during the prosecution of the
patent on construction of the claims” is also different depending upon whether
the analysis is for section 112, paragraph 6 or for the Doctrine of
Equivalents.167 “Under paragraph 112(6), a statement made during prosecution
may confine the range of equivalent structures, materials, or acts that are
directly claimed by the patent.”168 However, in the context of a Doctrine of
Equivalents analysis, protection is sought beyond the invention claimed by the
Thus, “the judge’s claim construction, which includes the
patent.169
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

C.R. Bard Inc. v. M3 Sys. Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
IMS Tech. Inc. v. Haas Automation Inc., 206 F.3d 1422, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
185 F.3d 1259, 1268-69 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
52 F.3d 967, 976-79 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1467 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1467.
Id.
Id. at 1467-68.
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interpretation of claim terms, may not be sufficient to remove from the jury’s
consideration all subject matter that was disclaimed during prosecution.”170
“Prosecution history estoppel [will exclude] any equivalents surrendered
during prosecution.”171 Specifically, “statements made to overcome rejections
based . . . on prior art estop the patentee from extending its right to exclude
others from making, using, or selling subject matter known to be
insubstantially different from, or interchangeable with, claimed elements at the
time of the alleged infringement.”172 Both forms of equivalence require the
examination of the prosecution history as part of construction of the claims, but
“under the doctrine of equivalents, the judge gives the claim, properly
construed to exclude disclaimed subject matter, to the jury and then, where
appropriate, also instructs the jury on the possible range of equivalents that it
may or may not consider due to prosecution history estoppel.”173
IV. HOW TO EMPLOY 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6
A.

Properly Invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6

Under the framework for analyzing 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 established by the
Federal Circuit, if the word “means” is used in combination with a function,
there is a rebuttable presumption that 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 applies.174 It is not
170. Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1468.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus. Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“The use
of the word ‘means’ ‘triggers a presumption that the inventor used this term advisedly to invoke
the statutory mandate for means-plus-function clauses.’”); York Prods., Inc. v. Cent. Tractor
Farm & Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Micro Chem. Inc. v. Great Plains
Chem. Co., 194 F.3d. 1250, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“If the word ‘means’ appears in a claim
element in association with a function, this court presumes that § 112, P. 6 applies.”). See also,
Kemco Sales Inc. v. Control Papers Co., 208 F.3d.1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The term
‘means’ in this limitation creates a presumption that a section 112 has been invoked.”); Al-Site
Corp. v. VSI Int’l Inc., 174 F.3d.1308, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Specifically, if the word ‘means’
appears in a claim element in combination with a function, it is presumed to be a means-plusfunction element to which § 112, ¶ 6 applies.”); Signtech USA Ltd. v. Vutek Inc., 174 F.3d.1352,
1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Typically, if the word ‘means’ appears in a claim element in combination
with a function, it is presumed to be a means-plus-function element to which § 112, ¶ 6 applies.”);
Unidynamics Corp. v. Automatic Prods. Int’l Ltd., 157 F.3d.1311, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The
use of the term ‘means’ generally (but not always) shows that the patent applicant has chosen the
option of means-plus-function format invoking § 112, ¶ 6 construction.”); Sage Prods. Inc. v.
Devon Indus. Inc., 126 F.3d. 1420, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“The use of the word ‘means,’ which is
part of the classic template for functional claim elements, gives rise to ‘a presumption that the
inventor used the term advisedly to invoke the statutory mandates for means-plus-function
clauses.’”) (citing York Prods., 99 F.3d at 1574); Wenger Mfg. Inc. v. Coating Mach. Sys. Inc.,
239 F.3d. 1225, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“In determining whether a claim limitation is a means-
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necessary to use the exact language “means for” specified by the statute. For
instance, in Signtech USA Limited v. Vutek Inc.,175 the claim element at issue
was “ink delivery means,” in which the Federal Circuit used the term “means”
in association with a function, namely “ink delivery.” The Federal Circuit said
that “[a]lthough the phrase ‘means for’ is not used, the phrase ‘ink delivery
means’ is equivalent to the phrase ‘means for ink delivery,’ because ‘ink
delivery’ is purely functional language. Furthermore, the claim does not recite
disqualifying structure which would prevent application of Section 112, Para.
6.”176
The failure to use the “means for” signal can affect the treatment of the
language in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. According to the Manual
of Patent Examining Procedure, section 2181, a claim element that does not
include the phrase “means for” or “step for” will not be considered to invoke
section 112, paragraph 6.177 To receive treatment under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6,
the applicant must either amend the claim to include “means for” or “step for”
or show that the claim limitation “is written as a function to be performed and
does not recite sufficient structure, material or acts which would preclude
application of 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph.”178
The word “means” only creates a rebuttable179 presumption that section
112, paragraph 6 applies, because many patent attorneys are so enamored with
the word “means,” they use it even when they do not want to invoke section
112, paragraph 6.180 Thus, “[t]he mere use of the word ‘means’ after a
limitation, without more, does not suffice to make that limitation a means-plusfunction limitation.”181 “The presumption that 35 U.S.C. § 112 applies is
rebutted where a claim uses the word ‘means’ but specifies no corresponding
function for the ‘means’.”182 The presumption is also rebutted by showing that

plus-function limitation, ‘the use of the word means creates a presumption that § 112, ¶ 6
applies.’”) (citing Personalized Media Communication, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d
696, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
175. Signtech, 174 F.3d at 1352.
176. Id. at 1356.
177. Manual of Patent Examining Procedure [hereinafter “MPEP”], § 2181 at p. 2100-214.
178. Id.
179. Sage Prods., 126 F.3d at 1427 (“However, the presumption is not conclusive.”).
180. Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus. Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“As in
Cole, the drafter of the ‘220 patent ‘was clearly enamored of the word ‘means.’”) (citing Cole v.
Kimberly Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 531 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
181. Allen Eng’g, 299 F.3d at 1347 (citing Cole, 102 F.3d at 531).
182. Id. (“a claim element that uses the word means but recites no function corresponding to
the means does not invoke §112, P6.”)) (quoting York Prods. Inc., v. Cent Tractor Farm Inc., 99
F.3d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir 1996)). See also Sage Prods., 126 F.3d at 1422) (“where a claim uses
the word ‘means,’ but specifies no corresponding function for the ‘means,’ it does not implicate
section 112.”); Wenger Mfg. Inc. v. Coating Mach. Sys. Inc., 239 F.3d 1225, 1232 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (“However, a limitation that uses the word ‘means’ but does not recite a function that
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the claim also specifies the structure for performing the function.183
“[A]ccording to the language of the statute, § 112, ¶ 6 governs only claim
elements that do not recite sufficient ‘structure, material, or acts in support [of
the means- or step-plus-function element].’”184
It can be difficult to determine when there is sufficient structure in the
claim to remove the element from section 112, paragraph 6, so the practitioner
must be very careful. In Unidynamics Corporation v. Automatic Products
International Limited, the Federal Circuit held that the recitation of the word
“spring” does not remove “spring means tending to keep the door closed” from
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.185 The Federal Circuit distinguished “spring means
tending to keep the door closed” from the “perforation means” in Cole v.
Kimberly Clark, because the latter included both a structure and a location.186
“A claim term recites sufficient structure if ‘the term, as the name for structure,
has a reasonably well understood meaning in the art.’”187 For example, in
Envirco Corporation v. Clestra Cleanroom Inc., the court found that
“[b]ecause the term baffle itself imparts structure, meaning surface that
deflects air, its use in the claims rebuts the presumption that § 112 ¶ 6
applies.”188
corresponds to the means does not invoke § 112, ¶ 6”) (citing Rodime PLC v. Seagate Tech., Inc.,
174 F.3d 1294, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
183. Allen Eng’g, 299 F.3d at 1347 (“even if the claim element specifies a function, if it also
recites sufficient structure or material for performing that function, § 112, P 6 does not apply.”)
(citing Rodime, 174 F.3d at 1302). See also Cole, 102 F.3d at 531 (“To invoke § 112, paragraph
6, the alleged means-plus-function claim element must not recite a definite structure which
performs the described function.”); Micro Chem. Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250,
1257 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (This presumption collapses, however, if the claim itself recites sufficient
structure, material, or acts to perform the claimed function.”); Sage Prods., 126 F.3d at 1427
(“Likewise, where a claim recites a function, but then goes on to elaborate sufficient structure,
material, or acts within the claim itself to perform entirely the recited function, the claim is not in
means-plus-function format.”); Wenger Mfg., 239 F.3d at 1232 (“Likewise, even when a
limitation does recite a function, if it also recites sufficiently definite structure for performing that
function, then § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply.”).
184. Signtech, 174 F.3d at 1356. See also Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l Inc., 174 F.3d 1308,
1318 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Nevertheless, according to its express terms, Section 112, ¶ 6 governs
only claim elements that do not recite sufficient structural limitations . . . . Therefore, the
presumption that Section 112, P. 6 applies is overcome if the claim itself recites sufficient
structure or material for performing the claimed function.”); Texas Digital Sys. Inc. v. Telegenix
Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Because this limitation is expressed in ‘means plus
function’ language and because it does not recite definite structure in support of its function, it is
subject to the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (1994).”) (citing B. Braun Med., Inc. v.
Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
185. 157 F.3d. 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
186. Id. at 1319-20.
187. Allen Eng’g, 299 F.3d at 1366 (quoting Watts v. XL Sys. Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 880-81
(Fed Cir. 2000)).
188. 209 F.3d 136 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1094

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47:1065

Ultimately, “[w]hether a limitation falls within § 112, ¶ 6 is a question of
law.”189 To reduce the risk of an unintended claim construction, practitioners
should use “means for” when invoking 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, and avoid all
other uses of the term “means,” at least in the claims. Follow “means for” only
with an identification of a function, and do not refer to any structure for
performing the identified function, or location of the structure.
Further, “[t]he difficulty of distinguishing acts from functions in step-plusfunction claim elements, however, makes identifying step-plus-function claims
inherently more problematic.”190 Thus, a drafter should take care to include
language in claims with a definite and clear meaning.191 “To invoke a
presumption of Section 112, P. 6 application, a claim drafter must use language
that expressly signals the recitation of a function as distinguished from an
act.”192 “Use of the word ‘step,’ by itself, does not invoke a presumption that
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 applies.”193 For example, method claim elements, which
often begin with the phrase ‘steps of,’ may be used without invoking
application of section 112, paragraph 6.194 “The phrase ‘steps of’ colloquially
signals the introduction of specific acts, rather than functions, and should
therefore not presumptively invoke application of Section 112, P. 6.”195
However, “[u]nlike ‘of,’ the preposition ‘for’ colloquially signals the recitation
of a function.”196 Thus, the phrase “step for” generally introduces functional
claim language falling under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 and is conventionally used
by drafters when intending to invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. 197 Therefore, when
the phrase “step for” is recited in a method claim, a presumption arises that 35
U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 applies.198
However, “[e]ven when a claim element uses language that generally falls
under the step-plus-function format,” 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 “still does not apply
when the claim limitation itself recites sufficient acts for performing the
specified function.”199 Section 112, paragraph 6 applies only when the means

189. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 296 F.3d. 1106 (Fed. Cir. 2002). See
also Personalized Media Communications, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 696, 702 (Fed.
Cir. 1998); Mas-Hamilton Group v. LaGard, Inc., 156 F.3d 1206, 1213-14 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
190. Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track and Court Constr., 172 F.3d 836, 848-49 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (Rader, J., concurring).
191. Seal-Flex, Inc., 172 F.3d at 849.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 849.
196. Seal-Flex, Inc., 172 F.3d at 849.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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plus function recitation is provided without definite structure, including when
“step for” language is recited without acts.200
Thus, practitioners should pay careful attention to the use of “step for”
versus “step of” in their claims, with the former presumptively implicating 35
U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, and the latter, not giving rise to such presumption.
B.

Avoid Unintentional Application of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6

Just as the use of the word “means” creates a rebuttable presumption that
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 applies, the absence of the word “means” creates a
rebuttable presumption that means-plus function claiming under 35 U.S.C. §
112, ¶ 6 does not apply.201 This presumption can be rebutted if the claim
contains only function, without structure.202 In an attempt to avoid the
limitations of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, patent practitioners may claim an element
functionally, but omitting the magic word “means.” However, where no
structure is recited, and the terms used have no established structural
connotation, the omission of the word “means” will not prevent the application
of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.203 This was the case in Mas-Hamilton Group Inc. v.
LaGard Inc., where the court found that 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 applied to the
limitation “moving element” even though the claims did not use the word
“means.”204 The Federal Circuit said, “In the instant case, even though the
catch phrase is not used, the limitation’s language does not provide any
structure. The limitation is drafted as a function to be performed rather than
definite structure or materials.”205 The Federal Circuit said that if it did not
apply 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 to the claimed “moving element,” it “could be any
200. Id.
201. Micro Chem. Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(“Without the term ‘means,’ a claim element is presumed to fall outside means-plus-function
strictures.”). See also Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(“Therefore, when an element of a claim does not use the term ‘means,’ treatment as a meansplus-function claim element is generally not appropriate.”).
202. Micro Chem. Inc., 194 F.3d at 1257 (“[T]hat presumption can collapse when an element
lacking the term ‘means’ nonetheless relies on functional terms rather than structure or material to
describe performance of the claimed function.”). See also Al-Site, 174 F.3d at 1318 (“However,
when it is apparent that the element invokes purely functional terms, without the additional recital
of specific structure or material for performing that function, the claim element may be a meansplus-function element despite the lack of express means-plus-function language.”); Cole v.
Kimberly Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 521, 531 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Merely because an element does not
include the word ‘means’ does not automatically prevent that element from being construed as a
means-plus-function element.”); Mas-Hamilton Group v. LaGard Inc., 156 F.3d 1206, 1213-15
(interpreting “lever moving element” and “movable link member” under section 112, paragraph
6).
203. See MPEP, § 2181 at 2100-216 for examples of language that has triggered 35 U.S.C. §
112, ¶ 6, without the “means for” or “step for” signal.
204. Mas-Hamilton, 156 F.3d at 1206.
205. Id. at 1213.
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device that can cause the lever to move.”206 The Federal Circuit said that
“moving element” “cannot be construed so broadly to cover every conceivable
way or means to perform the function of moving a lever, and there is no
structure recited in the limitation that would save it from application of section
112, 6.”207
However, a limitation with a functional name may nonetheless avoid 35
U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 treatment, if it has a sufficiently well-known structural
connotation. For example, in Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., the
Federal Circuit construed the term “detent mechanism” as not invoking section
112, paragraph 6 because “detent mechanism” had a generally understood
meaning in the mechanical arts to describe structure.208
In drafting a claim, practitioners should remember that a limitation may be
found to be a means-plus-function limitation if its name is a function and it
cannot be shown to have a generally understood structural meaning in the
art.209
C. Broaden the Scope of Literal Infringement by Disclosing Alternate
Structures
Equivalence under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 is sufficiently broad that a patent
owner should not have to “include in the patent specification an exhaustive list
of structures that possibly could perform each function described in the
claim.”210 “Patentees are required to disclose in the specification some
enabling means for accomplishing the function set forth in the ‘means plus
function’ limitation.”211 “At the same time, there is and can be no requirement
that applicants describe or predict every possible means of accomplishing that
function.”212 “The statute, §112-6, was written precisely to avoid a holding
that a means-plus-function limitation must be read as covering only the means
disclosed in the specification.”213 However, 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 applies to all

206. Id. at 1214.
207. Id.
208. 91 F.3d 1580, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
209. Mas-Hamilton, 156 F.3d at 1206.
210. De Graffenried v. U.S., 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1321, 1340 (Cl. Ct. 1990).
211. D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 236, 238 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also
Epcon Gas Sys. Inc. v. Bauer Compressors Inc., 61 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1470,1477-78 (CA FC
2002) (“[S]tructure disclosed in the specification is ‘corresponding’ structure only if the
specification or prosecution history clearly links or associates that structure to the function recited
in the claim.”); B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1997);
Budde v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 250 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“As a quid pro quo for
the convenience of employing §112, paragraph 6, Budde has a duty to clearly link or associate
structure to the claimed function.”).
212. D.M.I. Inc., 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 238 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
213. Id. at 238.
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embodiments disclosed in the specification,214 and thus disclosure of multiple
embodiments does increase the scope of protection.
The drafter of the specification must do more than merely list elements, the
disclosure of the structure must be complete. “[S]tructure supporting a meansplus-function claim under Section 112, Para. 6 must appear in the
specification” and cannot be incorporated by reference.215 Thus, where there
are several embodiments of the invention disclosed, the means-plus-function
element includes the corresponding structure in each of the embodiments.216
While a patentee is not limited to the preferred embodiment, as the Federal
Circuit has observed, many patent specifications disclose little else.217 Thus,
dissatisfaction with the scope of a means-plus-function claims in many cases is
due to an inadequate specification. The Federal Circuit has said that by
choosing means-plus-function language to recite a claim element, the patentee
necessarily restricts the scope of this element to the structure disclosed in the
specification and its equivalents.218 But the extent of the restriction is in the
hands of the patent drafter.

214. Creo Products Inc. v. Presstek Inc., 64 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1385, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(“[P]roper application of §112 ¶ 6 generally reads the claim element to embrace distinct and
alternative described structures for performing the claimed function. Specifically, ‘disclosed
structure includes that which is described in a patent specification, including any alternative
structures identified.’”). Accord Ishida Co. v. Taylor, 55 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1449, 1452-53 (Fed.
Cir. 2000); Serrano v. Telular Corp., 111 F.3d 1578, 1583, 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1538, 1542
(Fed. Cir. 1997).
215. Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage Devices Inc., 53 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1225, 1229-30 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
216. Micro Chem. Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 52 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1258, 1264 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (“When multiple embodiments in the specification correspond to the claimed function,
proper application of Section 112, Para. 6 generally reads the claim element to embrace each of
those embodiments.”). See also Creo Products Inc. v. Presstek Inc., 64 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1385,
1391 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 296 F.3d 1106,
1113-14, 63 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1725, 1730 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). (“Accordingly, where the
specification discloses different alternative embodiments, the claim is valid even if only one
embodiment discloses corresponding structure.”).
217. Signtech USA Ltd. v. Vutek Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(“Although patentees are not necessarily limited to their preferred embodiment . . . interpretation
of a means-plus-function element requires this court to consult the structure disclosed in the
specification, which often, as in this case, describes little more than the preferred embodiment.”
(citing Serrano, 111 F.3d at 1583).
218. Signtech USA, 50 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1375 (“By choosing means-plus-function
language to recite the “ink delivery means” claim element, the patentee necessarily restricted the
scope of this element to the structure disclosed in the specification and its equivalents.”).
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D. Identify the Structure that Corresponds to the Means-Plus-Function
Limitation
It is the patent applicant’s responsibility to identify the structure that
corresponds to the means-plus-function element.219 “[S]tructure disclosed in
the specification is ‘corresponding’ structure only if the specification or
prosecution history clearly links or associates that structure to the function
recited in the claim.”220 “This duty to link or associate structure to function is
the quid pro quo for the convenience of employing Section 112, Para. 6.”221
Therefore, “[i]f one employs means-plus-function language in a claim, one
must set forth in the specification an adequate disclosure showing what is
meant by the claim language.”222 “If an applicant fails to set forth an adequate
disclosure, the applicant has in effect failed to particularly point out and
distinctly claim the invention as required by the second paragraph of section
112.”223 The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure provides detailed
guidelines for adequacy of the specification to support the claims under 35
U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2, as well as to comply with 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.224
The corresponding structure(s) of a means-plus-function limitation must be
disclosed in the written description in such a manner that one skilled in the art
will know and understand what structure corresponds to the means
limitation.225 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 does not contemplate the kind of openended reference to extrinsic works that paragraph one, the enablement
provision, does.226 Information incorporated by reference cannot take the
place of disclosure.227

219. Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 52 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1263
(“Application of Section 112, Para. 6 requires identification of the structure in the specification
which performs the recited function.”). See also B. Braun Med. Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d
1419, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
220. B. Braun Med., 124 F.3d at 1424. See also Generation II Orthotics Inc. v. Med. Tech.
Inc., 59 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1919, 1928 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing B. Braun Med., 124 F.3d at 1424
(“Structure disclosed in the specification is ‘corresponding’ structure only if the specification or
prosecution history clearly links or associates that structure to the function recited in the claim.”);
Cardiac Pacemakers, 63 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1730 (“In order to qualify as corresponding, the
structure must not only perform the claimed function, but the specification must clearly associate
the structure with performance of the function.”).
221. B. Braun Med., 43 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1900.
222. Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage Devices Inc., 53 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1225, 1229 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (citing In re Donaldson Co. Inc., 16 F.3d 1189, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (emphasis added)).
223. Id. at 1228.
224. MPEP, § 2181 at 2100-217.
225. Id. at 1229. See also Cardiac Pacemakers, 63 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at1730.
226. Atmel Corp., 53 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1230.
227. Id. at 1230.
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“This inquiry is undertaken from the perspective of a person of ordinary
skill in the art.”228 In In re Donaldson Co. Inc.,229 the Federal Circuit also
instructed the patent bar that it was up to the patent drafter to identify the
structure that corresponds to the claimed “means,” and the failure to do so
would mean the claim is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. §112, ¶ 2, for failing to
particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention:
Although paragraph six statutorily provides that one may use means-plusfunction language in a claim, one is still subject to the requirement that a claim
“particularly point out and distinctly claim” the invention. Therefore, if one
employs means-plus-function language in a claim, one must set forth in the
specification an adequate disclosure showing what is meant by that language.
If an applicant fails to set forth an adequate disclosure, the applicant has in
effect failed to particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention as
required by the second paragraph of section 112.230

“Such limitations are ‘construed to cover the corresponding structure,
material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.’”231
“To interpret ‘means plus function’ limitations as limited to a particular means
set forth in the specification would nullify the provision of § 112 requiring that
the limitation shall be construed to cover the structure described in the
specification and equivalents thereof.”232
E.

Carefully Specify the Function

The first step in construing a 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 element, is to identify
the function specified in the claim.233 One cannot change the function from
what is stated in the claims, 234 nor can one include structure beyond what is
necessary to perform the function specified in the claim.235 More specifically,

228. Cardiac Pacemakers, 63 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1730 (citing Amtel Corp. 198 F.3d at
1378-79).
229. 29 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1845, 1850 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that “pursuant to this
provision, structure disclosed in the specification is ‘corresponding’ structure only if the
specification or prosecution history clearly links or associates that structure to the function recited
in the claim”).
230. In re Donaldson, 29 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1850.
231. IMS Technology Inc. v. Haas Automation Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1129, 1133 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (1994)).
232. D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 236, 238 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
233. Asyst Tech., Inc. v. Empak Inc., 60 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1567, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(“The first step in construing a means-plus-function limitation is to identify the function explicitly
recited in the claim.”).
234. Micro Chem. Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 52 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1258, 1263 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (“The statute does not permit limitation of a means-plus-function claim by adopting a
function different from that explicitly recited in the claim.”).
235. Asyst Tech., 60 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1571 (“Section 112 paragraph 6 does not ‘permit
incorporation of structure from the written description beyond that necessary to perform the
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“[s]tructural features that do not actually perform the recited function do not
constitute corresponding structure and thus do not serve as claim
limitations.”236 Therefore the definition of the function is important. The
patent practitioner should not focus on the function performed by the particular
structure selected by the inventor, but instead should attempt to step back to
determine the ultimate function that has to be performed. For example, in
Unidynamics Corporation v. Automatic Products International Limited, the
claim required of “spring means tending to keep the door closed” that the
Federal Circuit said, when read in light of written description, requires an
element to provide closing action in addition to keeping the door closed once it
is in a closed position.237 The patent drafter must try to identify the ultimate
function, and not use terms that might suggest how the particular element
selected by the inventor functions.
F.

Avoid Actions That Potentially Could Limit The Scope of Equivalents

When drafting a specification and making statements (both written and
verbal) during prosecution of a patent application, careful consideration should
be given to the specific disclosures and statements to avoid unintended
limitation of the scope of claim equivalents. “An inventor may use the
specification and prosecution history to define what his invention is and what it
is not, particularly when distinguishing the invention over prior art.”238 “[Not
only] can prosecution history estoppel act to estop an equivalence argument
under the doctrine of equivalents, positions taken before the PTO may bar an
inconsistent position on claim construction under Section 112, Para. 6.”239 For
example, statements detailing the shortcomings of the relevant prior art have
been used in limiting the scope of means-plus-function claims.240 “When a
patentee advises the examiner (and the public after patent issuance) that a
particular structure is not within his invention, the patentee is not permitted to
assert in a subsequent infringement action that the same structure is equivalent
to the structure described in the patent’s specification for purposes of section

claimed function.’”). See also Micro Chem., 52 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1263 (“Nor does the
statute permit incorporation of structure from the written description beyond that necessary to
perform the claimed function.”).
236. Asyst Tech., 60 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1571.
237. 48 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1099 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
238. Ballard Med. Prod. v. Allegiance Healthcare Corp., 60 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1493, 1499
(Fed. Cir. 2001).
239. Ballard Med. Prod., 60 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1499.
240. Id. See, e.g., Signtech USA, Ltd. v. Vutek, Inc., 174 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(Wherein the patentee, which used means-plus-function claim format, noted that the structure
used by certain prior art was “incapable” of achieving the desired results of the invention. It was
held to be an “explicit disavowal of prior art structure,” which was properly used in construing
the means-plus-function claims.).
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112, paragraph 6.”241 Further, it should be noted that the same distinctions of
the prior art that inform the claim construction under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, give
rise to prosecution history estoppel and prevent the Doctrine of Equivalents
from capturing structure that the patentee surrendered during prosecution.242
Thus, care should be taken to characterize anything as falling outside the scope
of the invention (e.g., in an amendment or inventor affidavit).
Further, it has been held that “claim differentiation can not broaden claims
beyond their correct scope.”243 “That the patentee chose several words in
drafting a particular limitation of one claim, but fewer (though similar) words
in drafting the corresponding limitation in another, does not mandate different
interpretations of the two limitations.”244 “Moreover, that the claims are
presumed to differ in scope does not mean that every limitation must be
distinguished from its counterpart in another claim, but only that at least one
limitation must differ.”245 There must be support in the specification for using
a broad definition to define a claim term, or some other demonstration that the
definition is the normal and ordinary meaning.246 Thus, if each and every
embodiment disclosed in the specification of an application discloses or
teaches a particular structure, the applicant is limited to that structure.247
Further, it may not be sufficient to state generally in the specification that a
particular element or component may take different forms, but specific
alternatives or possible modifications for each element or component should be
specifically disclosed.248 Also, statements in the specification relating to the
intended purpose may be used to limit equivalents.249 “Prosecution history is
similarly illustrative.”250 Further, the background of the invention portion of
the patent, including problems described therein may be used to limit

241. Ballard Med. Prod., 60 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1499.
242. Id. at 1502 (citing Multiform Desicants Inc. v. Medzam Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1480 (Fed.
Cir. 1998)).
243. Kraft Foods, Inc. v. Int’l Trading Co., 53 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1814, 1818 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
244. Kraft Foods, Inc., 53 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1818.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1818-19 (With respect to the written description, every disclosed embodiment that
employed a back panel employed one that was relatively stiff.).
248. Kraft Foods, Inc., 53 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1819 (“[A]lthough the written description
states that ‘[t]he back panel may take many different forms,’ the immediately succeeding
sentences reveal that such variations relate only to the size or location of the back panel and do
not discuss variations in stiffness.”).
249. Id. at 1819 (“[T]he written description reveals that at least one purpose of the ‘protecting
back panel’ is to protect the bottom of the tray compartments against indentation and damage and
the relatively rigid characteristic of the ‘protecting back panel’ promotes such protection.”).
250. Id. at 1819.
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equivalents.251 However, statements that merely indicate the patentees’
preference may not have such a restrictive effect.252 Although some of these
limitations have been applied when performing a Doctrine of Equivalents
analysis, their application appears to apply equally to a 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6
equivalents analysis, and should be considered when using means-plusfunction claims.
Thus, practitioners should pay careful attention to ensure that the various
embodiments disclosed in an application describe different structures, thereby
potentially increasing the scope of equivalents when a 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6
claim interpretation is performed. Further, care should be taken when making
statements during prosecution relating to structures disclosed in the
specification, because such statements may have an adverse effect on claim
construction of a means-plus-function limitation in a claim.253 Further,
positions taken before the Patent Office may bar inconsistent positions on
claim construction under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 similar to prosecution history
estoppel estopping an equivalence assertion under the Doctrine of
Equivalents.254
Thus, the authors strongly suggest including in the application as many
alternatives and various embodiments as are possible to provide the broadest
scope of equivalents under a 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 analysis.
CONCLUSION
While means-plus-function claim limitations under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 do
not have the broad scope that they were believed to have in their heyday when
claims in the majority of issuing utility patents contained “means” or “means
for”, means-plus-function claims still provide important benefits that justify
their more frequent use. Attempts at using broad functional language as an end
run around 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 will not work, and if a broad functional claim
limitation is found to be a 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 in an application that was not

251. Id. at 1821 (In Dawn Equip. Co. v. Kentucky Farms Inc., 140 F.3d 1009, 1114 (Fed. Cir.
1998), the background of the invention portion of the patent described problems with certain prior
art mechanisms, which included the mechanism alleged to be equivalent, strongly suggested, if
not mandated, judgment in the defendant’s favor. The court held that the written description’s
“clear and uncontroverted” statements that the allegedly equivalent structure served a function
entirely opposite to that of the recited structure, coupled with the patent holder’s admission to the
same effect, precluded the patent holder from asserting the Doctrine of Equivalents. Dawn Equip.
Co., 140 F.3d at 1114.).
252. Kraft Foods, Inc., 53 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1822 (statements that although labels can be
arranged in any suitable way, it is preferable that they not bridge gaps between compartments are
not clear and uncontroverted statements).
253. Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co. Ltd., 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1667, 1673 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).
254. Alpex Computer Corp., 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1671.
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prepared with 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 in mind, the scope could be much narrower
than that to which the inventor was entitled.
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